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Perspective takingPeople typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even
deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show
that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomeswhen this information
is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this
information andmake attractive offerswhereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal andmakeunattractive
offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it
increased prosocials' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest thatmany people are not naturally inclined to
revealprivate informationwhen theyhaveanoutcomeadvantage, but that fairnessmotives encourage revelation
and, ironically, increase revealers' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays.e Netherlands Organization for
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one party knows, the others don't, and the distribution of information
can seriously affect both the bargaining process and its outcomes (De
Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). Information about who gets
what when a specific deal is closed may be common knowledge, but
often is only known to the specific individuals who benefit. Typical car
buyers, for instance, are aware of their own outcomes andwhether they
have paid more or less than they wanted. Almost never, however, do
they discover the sellers' or the car manufacturers' profits from their
transaction. In the current research we investigate the effects of having
and revealing private information about the payoffs in multiparty
negotiations. We show that the popular belief that people should guard
their private information and use it to maximize their own outcomes
can backfire in this context. Thus, unlike the general stereotype that
depicts negotiations as competitive, strategic, and stealthy, we identify
competitive interactions in which honesty pays.Information and bargaining
Bargainers who have private information must decide how to use
this information. In particular, they must choose whether they willshare their private information truthfully. Although revealing private
information may help to create positive outcomes because it helps
negotiators to discover creative outcomes that maximize their joint
benefit, in more competitive interactions or purely distributive
negotiations, revealing information risks non-reciprocity and exploi-
tation. These dynamics are embodied in the “information dilemma”
(Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999): revealing infor-
mation facilitates the achievement of joint outcomes but simulta-
neously increases personal vulnerability.
Economic theories generally assume that bargainers aim to
maximize their individual outcomes and that they will use their
private information self-interestedly. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996),
for example, studied the impact of private information in a competitive
negotiation in which the currency (chips) was worth more to one
party than to the other. Results showed that bargainers who had an
exchange-rate advantage offered their counterparts more than half of
the chips only when they knew that their counterparts were aware of
the exchange rates. When they knew that their counterparts were
uninformed, they tended to offer an equal split—which looked fair on
the surface but which gave them much better outcomes than their
counterparts because of their exchange-rate advantage.
Moreover, when bargainers have the option to reveal that their
outcome advantage, the central notion of self interest, which is
common to many bargaining models, suggests that they will keep this
information to themselves (Gneezy, 2005; Thompson, 1991). The
allure of higher outcomes can lead negotiators to not only protect but
to actively misrepresent their payoffs (e.g. Lewicki, 1983; Roth &
Murnighan, 1982; Strudler, 1995; Tenbrunsel, 1998). Research has
shown that deception increases when: negotiators know that theirand disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
2 I. van Beest et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2011) xxx–xxxcounterparts lack information (Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003),
stakes are high (Tenbrunsel, 1998), they have task experience
(Murnighan et al., 1999), they expect competition rather than
cooperation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), they aim tomaximize personal
rather than joint gains (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997), or they face a
stranger rather than a friend (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999) or an angry
rather than a happy opponent (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van
Beest, 2008).
In short, theories predict and empirical research indicates that
bargainers typically use private information to maximize their own
outcomes: they make self-serving offers when information is private
and they often misrepresent the value of their payoffs when they can
reveal their private information. Thus, bargainers are not only
reluctant to reveal their outcome advantages—they often use this
information to increase their own outcomes.
Private information in coalition formation
These conclusions are all based on theories and observations of
dyadic negotiations, settings where the strategic use of information
can provide outcome benefits.1 Indeed, when dyadic bargainers can
exchange information, truth-tellers often do worse than liars (e.g.,
Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). In fact, bargainers who reveal that
they have an outcome advantage, e.g., a superior exchange rate, give
their disadvantaged counterparts an opportunity to argue for
egalitarian outcomes (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Roth &Murnighan,
1982). By restricting information exchange, advantaged players can
obtain higher outcomes by making self-serving offers (e.g., Kagel et
al., 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Van Dijk, De Cremer, &
Handgraaf, 2004; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). In sharp contrast,
however, we suggest that these effects need not generalize to
distributive multiparty settings in which coalitions must form to
secure favorable outcomes (for reviews of coalition formation, see e.g.,
Kahan & Rapoport, 1984; Komorita, 1984; Komorita & Parks, 1995;
Murnighan, 1978; Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007).
Coalition formation has been defined as a process in which two or
more parties negotiate about the decision to allocate payoffs to the
parties who are included in the coalition (Kahan & Rapoport, 1984;
Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1998), leaving excluded parties with zero
outcomes as well as emotional losses (e.g., Swaab, Kern, Medvec, &
Diermeier, 2009; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Williams, 2007).
Examples of coalitions can be found at every level of human
organization: romantic couples are social coalitions; trade unions
are coalitions of workers who have joined forces to obtain better
working conditions; mergers are coalitions of companies that hope to
create economic synergies and increase their market share; and
political parties are coalitions of individuals who hope to influence a
nation's politics. Some coalitions formwith exclusion as their primary
purpose, e.g., groups based on class distinctions that alienate, restrict,
and restrain the under-privileged; others push people into exclusion
as a result of the negotiation outcome.
An important aspect of the coalition formation process is that
individuals must not only consider the possible payoffs that they can
obtain from different coalitions—they must also be concerned about
being included in the winning coalition. In fact, this latter concern
must be satisfied to succeed in the former. The need to be included
requires a different set of strategies than the goal of maximizing one's
outcomes. Individuals who come across as attractive increase their
chances of being included in the final, winning coalition; individuals
who come across as unattractive, e.g., by making strong demands or1 This is especially true for competitive, zero-sum interactions. When there is room
for integrative bargaining, revealing private information can lead to better individual
payoffs. Even then, however, bargainers are often reluctant to share information about
their individual payoffs (Steinel, Abele, & De Dreu, 2007; Thompson, 1991).
Please cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
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even provide an impetus for others to coalesce against them. The
harsh reality that accompanies coalition formation is that some
people will be completely excluded, both from membership in the
coalition and from the payoffs that comes with inclusion. Unlike
dyadic negotiations in which both parties are either included or
excluded from an agreement, the fact that coalition negotiations
exclude some people means that bargainers must first attend to
securing a position within the coalition before considering its payoffs
(Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007).
The need for inclusionmeans that appearing attractive to potential
coalition partners can be critical. A particularly useful and obvious
strategy to achieve this goal is to make attractive offers, i.e., offers that
are larger than the offers that other players make. Some authors have
argued that it is exactly this aspect of coalition strategizing that many
bargainers fail to appreciate (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Van Beest
& Van Dijk, 2007; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), primarily because people
have a natural tendency to approach multiparty interactions as they
do dyadic interactions. Basic routines for managing social exchange
first evolve in dyads and only transfer to multi-party interactions later
(Binder & Diehl, 2008; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006). Thus, coalition
bargainers may approach potential coalition partners with a dyadi-
cally appropriate, self-focused strategy, not realizing that an other-
focused, “what can I do for you?” strategy can help them look more
attractive and set them up for positive coalition outcomes.
Previous research has providedmany examples of this unfortunate
tendency (Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007). A classic example is the often
observed “strength-is-weakness effect” (Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff,
1967; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1991; Vinacke & Arkoff,
1957). Equity theory suggests that those who bring more resources
should also get more outcomes (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978),
andmany bargainers naturally expect that havingmore resources will
help them obtain greater relative outcomes. In multiparty interac-
tions, however, ‘strong’ parties who have more resources are often
excluded when parties with fewer resources still have enough
resources, collectively, to form a winning coalition. In this instance,
“strength” leads to exclusion (“weakness”) when the lower-resource
parties can obtain the coalition's benefits for less cost. Another
example concerns anger expressions: in two-party bargaining, people
who express anger often obtain superior outcomes (e.g., Sinaceur &
Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a,b). Commu-
nicating anger in coalition bargaining, however, can backfire when
anger alienates a person's potential coalition partners (Van Beest, Van
Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Thus, although appearing strong and
demanding can be beneficial in dyadic settings, it can be particularly
detrimental when being included is of primary importance.
This suggests that coalition bargainers may underestimate the
importance of inclusion, particularly when they have a payoff
advantage.2 In these situations, well-endowed bargainers can actually
do well by revealing their outcome advantages. Why? Because their
outcome advantage raises the joint outcome of any coalition that
includes them, which allows them to make particularly attractive
offers that potential rivals may not be able to match. We predict,
however, that well-endowed players will not make use their
advantage effectively. Instead, we expect that they will keep their
payoff information private and fail to make attractive offers, all in the
false hope of maximizing outcomes that will never materialize.2 Having private information about an outcome advantage is only detrimental when
the a priori odds of inclusion in the winning coalition are less than the a priori odds of
one's rivals. For example, in veto games, veto players must be included in the final
coalition; for them, having an outcome advantage and not revealing it can be
profitable because inclusion is no longer their first strategic concern.
nefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
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3 Analyses of participants' gender led to no significant effects. The results should be
interpreted cautiously, however, because so many participants in the sample were
women.
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This discussion has been based on the implicit assumption that
coalition bargainers are motivated to maximize their payoffs. An
alternative motivation that drives many bargainers is the desire to be
fair (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman,
1989; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007). People
who are motivated by fairness are likely to have a natural inclination
to disclose private information and to avoid taking advantage of
unearned outcome advantages. Thus, we predict that fair-minded
bargainers will reveal their private information and use their outcome
advantages to increase their counterparts' outcomes (as well as their
own) more than bargainers who are more motivated by self-interest.
We also expect that this will result in their being included in more
final coalitions and, ironically, obtaining better payoffs. In contrast, we
expect that bargainers who are more motivated by self-interest will
be less likely to reveal their private information and less likely tomake
attractive offers, hoping to maximize their individual outcomes, and
that this will lead them to achieve the exact opposite of what they
hope for.
Research overview
We tested these predictions in three studies that incorporated
information asymmetries within a classic coalition setting. In each
study the participants negotiated a prize of 10 (Study 1) or 20 valuable
chips (Studies 2 and 3) in a 4(3–2–2) simple weightedmajority game.
In this game, the number outside the parentheses, 4, denotes the
minimum number of resources required to form a winning coalition
and obtain 10 chips. The numbers inside the parentheses, 3–2–2,
denote the number of resources each player possesses: player A
controls 3 resources; players B and C each control 2. This particular
distribution of resources has a long history in coalition research
(Caplow, 1968; Chertkoff, 1967; Kelley &Arrowood, 1960;Murnighan,
1991; Vinacke&Arkoff, 1957). Themost frequently formed coalition in
the 4(3–2–2) game is the BC-coalition, with B and C sharing the payoff
equally. Thus, just on the basis of their resources, player As face a
strength-is-weakness challenge: their additional resource sets them
up to be excluded from the winning coalition. To counteract this, we
provided them with two strategic benefits: an additional outcome
advantage and private information that they had this outcome
advantage. These two benefits give them an opportunity to overcome
the disadvantage that their extra resource has created. We predict,
however, that they will not use this opportunity: they will not reveal
their outcome advantage and this will result in frequent exclusions
from the winning coalitions (and zero payoffs).
Thus, we investigated player As who had a resource advantage,
private information, and an outcome advantage (in the form of a
favorable exchange rate; e.g., Kagel et al., 1996). This allowed them to
make more attractive offers than player Bs and Cs could make to each
other, even as they obtained outcomes that were larger than their
coalition partner. Here is how: because players B and C have equal
resources, sharing the 10 chips equally (giving each of them 5 Euro) is
an obvious outcome. Player As, in contrast, can offer either B or C 6
chips and demand only 4, increasing B or C's outcome and, as due to
their exchange rate advantage each chip is worth 2 Euro to them, still
yielding them8 Euro. This strategymakes player As attractive in terms
of the outcomes that they can provide to their partners. (Offering 7
and retaining 3 makes player As even more attractive and still garners
them 6 Euro—far better than the zero outcome that comes with
exclusion.)
Although this logic seems obvious, we expected that player As
would try to use their information advantage to maximize their own
outcomes rather than to maximize their offer's attractiveness. That is,
we expected them to make offers that, if accepted, would increase
their outcomes [e.g., offering 4 or 5 chips so that they could get 5 or 6Please cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jesp.201chips (to obtain 10 or 12 Euros)], even though these offers would not
be more attractive than B's and C's offers to each other (i.e., 5 chips).
Thus, we expected that player As would not do well when they alone
had information about their exchange advantage. This outcomewould
replicate the classic strength-is-weakness effect in a markedly
different context, one in which the strong player has both payoff
and information advantages.
Ironically, we also expected that player As would do better when
their strategic benefits were reduced, i.e., when their exchange rate
advantage was common information. Knowing that A had a better
exchange rate signals that any coalition with A will yield more joint
payoffs than any coalition without player A. This should result in
players As getting more offers and increase the likelihood of their
being included in the winning coalition (and thus earning better
payoffs). We also expected that this might also lead them to make
more attractive offers themselves, which would also increase their
likelihood of inclusion.
The irony is that this condition imposes on player As exactly what
they might not choose if they had the choice to reveal their private,
exchange rate information. Thus, Studies 2 and 3 gave them this
choice and assessedwhether they revealed their exchange advantage;
both studies also investigated a variety of mechanisms that might
affect this choice, including fairness motivations, social value
orientations, and perspective taking. Study 2 tested our underlying
prediction that fairness motivations will increase information disclo-
sure as well as the likelihood of player As making more attractive
offers. Study 3 draws attention to the fact that fairness concerns go
hand in hand with a focus on other's outcomes that can provide
strategic insights that are less available for people who are less
concerned with others' payoff. Thus, Study 3 induced perspective
taking to determinewhether this would lead bargainers tomakemore
attractive offers. Study 3 also measured individuals' social value
orientations to determine whether this augmenting effect generalized
for self and other-oriented individuals or whether, in contrast,
perspective taking might actually exacerbate individuals' original
orientations.
Study 1
Study 1 tested our prediction that coalition bargainers who have
private information about an exchange-rate advantage will not use
their information effectively to increase their outcomes. Instead, we
expected that most of themwould fail to make attractive offers, which




Participants were 102 undergraduates at a Dutch university (74
females and 28 males; Mean age=20.16, SD=2.56); they were
randomly assigned to one of the 3–2–2 positions and to either the
informed or the uninformed condition,3 resulting in 17 three-player
groups in each condition. Participants were told that their monetary
payoff would be based on their bargaining performance; after the
experiment, however, everyone was paid 6 Euro (about 8 US$ at the
time of the experiment).
Procedure
Participants were seated at computers in separate cubicles and
informed that theywere participating in a study of coalition formation.
Their task was based on the landowner paradigm (for a more detailednefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
1.02.013
Table 1
The players' offers to each other in the two information conditions; Study 1.
Uninformed condition Informed condition
Offers from To player B To player C To player B To player C
Player A n M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD
15 4.8 .94 2 5.0 .00 10 5.5 1.2 7 5.4 .98
Offers from To player A To player C To player A To player C
Player B n M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD
0 – – 17 5.0 .00 9 4.2 .83 8 5.0 .00
Offers from To player A To player B To player A To player B
Player C n M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD
1 4.0 – 16 5.0 .52 6 5.0 1.1 11 4.72 .65
4 I. van Beest et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2011) xxx–xxxdescription see e.g., Van Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 2003). Participants
played the role of landowners who could only obtain payoffs if they
sold their parcel of land. After a (bogus) quiz to determine the relative
size of each parcel, one participant (player A) ‘earned’ a parcel of 3 ha
and the other two participants (players B and C) each earned parcels of
2 ha. They learned that a project developer wanted to buy at least 4 ha
of land for afixed price of 10 valuable chips. It was explicitly stated that
no single landowner had enough land to satisfy the developer's
demands; they therefore needed to form a coalition with one other
landowner. It was also made clear that people could only sell their
entire parcel and that money could only be earned if they managed to
sell their parcel. Like previous coalition research (e.g., Kelley &
Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1991), we did not allow participants to
form a grand coalition that included everyone; in addition, they were
not allowed to allocate payoffs to landownerswhowere excluded from
the winning coalition.
The players then learned the value of each of their chips. This
information included the manipulation of the independent variable,
i.e., whether player Bs and Cs knew of player As' exchange advantage.
Either all three participants or just player A learned that player As
could exchange each of their chips for 2 Euro and that players B and C
could exchange each of their chips for 1 Euro. In the informed
condition all players were thus aware of player A's exchange-rate
advantage; in the uninformed condition only player As were aware.
The instructions then described the logistics of their negotiation
(Komorita & Meek, 1978; Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004).
Negotiations took place in rounds and continued until a coalition was
formed. In each round all three participantsmade one offer that identified
the coalition's partners and how they wanted to allocate the chips if this
coalition formed. No other communication was possible. All three
received the others' offers and all three were instructed that they could
only select one. A coalition formed when both members of a potential
coalition selected the same offer. If a coalition did not form, e.g., if A
selected B's offer, B selected C's, and C selected A's, theymade a new set of
offers. No other communications were allowed.
After the negotiations, participants completed a questionnaire that
checked whether participants could identify their exchange rates and
the coalitions that would include them.
Results
Manipulation checks
All of the participants accurately recalled their own exchange rates
and, in the informed condition, player A's higher rate. All players B and
C in the uninformed conditions assumed that everyone had the same
exchange rates, and everyone recalled their potential coalition
memberships. Thus, the manipulations were successful.
Proposed coalitions
We hypothesized that players A would be included in more
proposals in the informed condition than in the uninformed condition.
To test this prediction, we analyzed the coalition proposals made by
players B and C. (Players As' proposals are less relevant here, as players
A are necessarily included in all coalitions that they propose; see
Table 1 for a complete overview of all frequencies and means).4
We conducted a 2 (condition: informed vs. uninformed)×2
(player: B vs. C)×2 (coalition type: including player A vs. excluding
player A) loglinear analysis. Results revealed a main effect of coalition4 A high loglinear analysis indicated that player As were more likely to propose an
AB-coalition in the uninformed condition (15 AB-coalition proposals versus 2 AC-
coalition proposals) than in the informed condition (10 AB-coalition proposals versus
7 AC-coalition proposals), χ2 (1, N=34)=3.78, p=.05. This is somewhat surprising
given that there are no a priori reasons to assume a preference for one partner over the
other. We speculate that perhaps player As were more heuristic in the uninformed
condition as they seemed to prefer forming a coalition with the letter that comes first
in the alphabet.
Please cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
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frequently excluded from player Bs' and Cs' proposals. Furthermore, a
condition by coalition type interaction, χ2(1, N=68)=18.62, pb .001
showed that player As received more offers when payoff information
was public: player As received only 1 of 34 offers in the uninformed
condition but 15 of 34 offers in the informed condition.
Proposed payoff allocations
As expected, player As made more attractive offers to potential
partners in the informed condition than in the uninformed condition
(M=5.47 chips, SD=0.88 versus M=4.82 chips, SD=1.07) t(32)=
1.93, pb .05. Moreover, subsequent analysis that categorized offers as
attractive (more than 5 chips), unattractive (less than 5 chips), or
equal (5 chips) showed that this effect resulted primarily because
theymade 3 times as many attractive offers (12 of 17) in the informed
than in the uninformed conditions (4 of 17), χ2(2, N=34)=8.90,
pb .005.
Analyses of the value of Bs' and Cs' offers suggest that they tried to
capitalize on player As' exchange rate in the informed condition.
Player Bs used this strategy more than player Cs did: a 2(coalition
type)×2(player) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded one significant
effect, the interaction: F(1, 30)=4.26, pb .05. Although player Cs
made fairly similar offers to player As (M=5.00, SD=1.10) and to Bs
(M=4.72, SD=0.64), t(15)=−0.6, ns, player Bs offered player As
significantly less (M=4.22, SD=0.83) than they offered player Cs
(M=5.00, SD=0.00), t(15)=2.63, pb .05.
Coalitions and final payoffs
The information conditions also influenced the composition of the
winning coalitions (see Table 2) and the players' payoffs (see Table 3).
As predicted, player As were included in the winning coalition less
often in the uninformed (18%) than in the informed condition (65%),
χ2(1, N=34)=7.78, pb .005. This had a tremendous negative impact
on their final payoffs: a 2 (condition)×3 (players) repeated measures
ANOVA with players as a within factor yielded main effects for
information, F(1, 32)=9.32, pb .005, players, F(1, 32)=4.16, pb .03,
and their interaction, F(2, 31)=4.71, pb .02.
The information main effect shows that the players obtained
higher overall payoffs in the informed (M=12.88, SD=2.28)
compared to the uninformed conditions (M=10.76, SD=1.70). TheTable 2
Frequencies of coalitions formed in the information conditions; Study 1.
AB-coalition AC-coalition BC-coalition
Uninformed condition 3 0 14
Informed condition 8 3 6
Total 11 3 20
nefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
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Table 3
The players' payoffs (in €) as a function of the information conditions; Study 1.
Player A Player B Player C
M SD M SD M SD
Uninformed condition 1.53 3.36 5.12 .33 4.12 1.93
Informed condition 5.76 4.48 4.47 2.17 2.65 2.57
5I. van Beest et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2011) xxx–xxxplayers main effect shows that player Bs' payoffs (M=4.79,
SD=1.59) were marginally higher than player As' (M=3.64,
SD=4.52, t(33)=1.33, p=.10) and significantly higher than player
Cs' (M=3.38, SD=2.39; t(33)=2.43, p=.01); player As' and Cs' did
not differ significantly (t(33)=.23, ns).
The more important finding was the interaction, which showed
that player As benefited from complete information, t(32)=−3.05,
p=.001, and that player Cs benefited from incomplete information,
t(32)=1.85, p=.05. Player Bs outcomes were relatively unaffected
by conditions, t(32)=1.19, ns. As shown in Table 3, player As' average
payoffs increased almost four-fold when everyone knew about their
exchange rate advantage.
Opening offers and final payoffs
Player Asmade fewer attractive offers in the uninformed condition
than the informed condition; they also did less well in the uninformed
condition. A logistic regression analysis showed that lower opening
offers to either player B (β=2.45, SE=.84, pb .004) or player C
(β=2.47, SE=.84, pb .004) were associated with being included in
fewer winning coalitions. A linear regression analysis showed that
they were also associated with lower payoffs for player As, with either
player Bs (β=2.91, SE=.61, pb .001) or player Cs (β=2.78, SE=.63,
pb .001), F(2, 31)=11.13, pb .001. This shows that the detrimental
effect of having private information about an exchange rate advantage
is already apparent in opening offers.
Discussion
The results supported all of our predictions. Player As were
included in fewer coalitions and received lower overall payoffs when
they had important information that no one else had. Ironically, when
the other players knew about As' exchange-rate advantage, player As
did considerably better. This resulted from changes in player As' own
behavior and the behavior of the other players, as player As made
more attractive offers and the other players made player As more
offers and chose player A more often. These findings clearly indicate
that individuals who had an advantageous position were hurt rather
than helped by having more information. Although we predicted this
result, it also contradicts an old maxim that information is power. In
this case, it was more like a curse.
Study 2
Study 1 showed that player As' outcome advantage helped them
obtain superior coalition outcomes only when other negotiators were
informed about their advantage. Study 2 assessed whether people
voluntarily revealed their private information, truthfully deceptively,
or not at all, and if they did, whether their offers were more attractive
than player As' who did not reveal their information.
Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) observed that, in a dictator game, in
which one person could keep $10, share some of it with an
anonymous other person, or ‘opt out’ for $9, one third of their
participants took less money than they could have kept and opted out.
By doing so, they avoided the tough choice of whether and howmuch
to share. We expected that our participants might have similar
feelings: by choosing to send no information, they could avoid the
risks of revealing (either truthfully or deceptively). Thus, we expectedPlease cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
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expected that non-revealers and liars would compound their already
poor strategies by making less attractive offers than bargainers who
would disclose their outcome advantage.
Finally, we wanted to directly test our assumption that the
reluctance to reveal one's advantage and associated unattractive
offers are fueled by self-interest. Therefore, we assessed what
motivated the decision to disclose information and whether this
decision did indeed mediate the attractiveness of an offer. We
assumed that more self-oriented motives would thus facilitate
deception andwithholding information whereas more other-oriented
motives would facilitate honest revelations.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 91 students (74 females) from a Dutch
university (Mean age=19.73, SD=2.39); all had the role of player
A in a 4(3–2–2) landowner game. They were told that whatever they
obtained from the bargaining would be their experimental pay. After
the negotiations ended, they learned that they had negotiated with a
preprogrammed strategy; all were paid 3.50 Euro.
Procedure
Participants were seated at computers in individual cubicles. As in
Study 1, participants first completed a (bogus) quiz to determine their
resources in the game. After being designated player A, they learned
everyone's exchange rate for the chips that they might obtain: 1.5 Euro
for them but only 1 Euro for the other players. They were also told that
the other players were not aware of this difference and that the other
players typically assumed that everyone's exchange rateswere identical
(i.e., 1 Euro). The instructions then indicated that, prior to the start of
negotiation, each participant could send a message about the payoff
value of their chips to the other participants if they wished. They could
either reveal their outcome advantage, indicate that their exchange rate
was the same as the other players' (a lie), or send no information.
Participants were led to believe that the computer would randomly
determine who would make the first offer; in fact, the participants
alwaysmade thefirst offer. As before, their offers identified their desired
partner andhow theywanted to allocate the20 chips; offers to excluded
players and the three-player grand coalition were not allowed. The
participants' offers were always accepted; this ended the negotiation.
We then assessed participants' understanding of the instructions by
asking them to identify their exchange rates, the possible coalitions, and
the value of the payoffs. As in Study 1, all of the participants provided
correct answers to all of these questions.
Finally, we asked the participants whether they were motivated to
maximize their own outcomes, maximize the difference in their
outcomes, minimize the difference in their outcomes, maximize joint
outcomes, and obtain equal outcomes. We recoded the first two
questions and averaged their responses to form an index of their
concern for others (α=.77).
Results
Manipulation check
All participants correctly indicated their exchange rate, size of
their parcel, and number of coalition they could form.
Information and offers
Over half of the participants (n=50; 54.9%) chose to send no
information about their exchange rate; a small minority revealed
truthfully (n=18; 19.8%); and a slightly larger minority lied (n=23;
25.3%; χ2(1, N=91)=19.54, p=.001). In addition, revealers made
significantly larger offers (M=10.00, SD=1.81) than liars (M=8.86,nefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
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pb .001, η2=.24); the latter twomeans did not differ from each other.
A loglinear analysis of the frequencies of attractive (more than 10
chips), unattractive (less than 10 chips), and equal offers (10 chips)
yielded effects for revealers/liars/non-revealers, χ2(2, N=91)=
18.45, p=.001, for offer type, χ2(2, N=91)=36.08, p=.001, and
for their interaction, χ2(4, N=91)=32.39, p=.001. Revealers made
more attractive (8), fewer unattractive (7), and fewer equal offers (3)
than liars (0 attractive vs. 11 unattractive vs. 12 equal offers) or non-
revealers (0 attractive vs. 34 unattractive vs. 16 equal offers). Thus,
not sending information when the choice to do so was available was
associated with the same detrimental strategy as deception (cf.,
Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). These effects support our predictions.
Motivation and mediation5,6
A regression analysis revealed a positive association between
player As' concerns for others and the attractiveness of their offer,
β=.87, SE=.13, pb .001. A logistic regression also revealed a positive
association between player As' concerns for others and the likelihood
that they would reveal their exchange rate truthfully, β=5.47,
SE=1.26, pb .001. A third regression revealed a positive association
between revelations and attractive offers, β=.79, SE=.14, pb .001.
Controlling for revelations completely reduced the association
between concerns for others and attractive offers to non-significance,
β=.33, SE=.27, ns. Thus, these analyses indicate that truthfully
revealing one's exchange advantage fully mediated the relationship
between concern for others and the attractiveness of player As' offers.
Further analyses showed that this was not the case for deception or
not revealing one's exchange rate advantage, as concern for others
was not significantly associated with either of these decisions, B=.44,
SE=.79, ns. Sobel=3.44, pb .001.
Discussion
Study 2 investigated the coalition strategies of negotiators, who
had many resources, private information, and an exchange-rate
advantage. Not only did a minority of them choose to reveal their
exchange-rate advantage information, most participants chose not to
send any information at all. In addition, non-revealers tended to send
the same kinds of unattractive offers as negotiators who lied. Indeed,
the only people who made frequent attractive offers were the
negotiators who revealed their exchange-rate advantage. What do
these findings mean for the behavior of player As in Experiment 1?
Remember that in Experiment 1, player As could not communicate
about their exchange rate advantage—this was private or public
information by instructions. Player As benefitted from the experi-
mental instructions that revealed their exchange rate advantage to
their fellow players. The findings of Study 2 thus suggest that many of
the Study 1 player As in the informed condition may have benefitted
inadvertently because, if given the choice to honestly reveal their
exchange rate advantage, they would not have used this option5 MacKinnon (2008) and MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz (2007) describe a number
of methods to establish mediation. Most of these methods, with the bootstrap method
of Preacher and Hayes as one example, require that both the mediator and the
dependent variable are continuous variables. These methods cannot be performed in
our case, because the mediator is dichotomous, which require logistic or probit
regressions. We used the ‘joint test method’ (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007, p.
601), which has high statistical power (MacKinnon, 2008; 98–100) and can deal with
both logistic and normal regression analyses. With this technique, mediation results
when there is a statistically significant effect of the independent variable on the
mediator and a statistically significant effect of the mediator on the dependent
variable (controlling for the effect of the independent variable; MacKinnon, 2008;
394–395).
6 We also analyzed all 5 motivations separately. These separate analyses showed
that each separate motivation had its expected effect on offer and whether or not they
disclosed their exchange advantage. Hence, all motivations contributed to the reported
mediation analysis.
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condition who did relatively poorly would probably not have
benefitted from having the choice to reveal their private information,
as so many did not use that option.
The combination of the findings from these two studies is ironic:
rather than taking advantage of additional information, powerful
negotiators in these situations misused it, repeatedly, by not revealing
their information and by trying to take toomuch advantage of it. Thus,
these results suggest the old saying that “pigs get fed but hogs get
slaughtered.” They also indicate that, unlike the implications from
dyadic bargaining, both honesty and fairness pay in coalition
bargaining.
Because concerns for others were assessed at the end of the
experiment rather than being independently manipulated, however,
we can only make associative rather than causal conclusions about
their impact. Thus, to provide further evidence for our reasoning and
the underlying processes, Study 3 measured a stable disposition,
social value orientations, before the coalition formation interaction,
and it manipulated perspective taking. Moreover, instead of giving
bargainers also the option to tell nothingwe now only gave bargainers
the option to either tell the truth or to tell a lie about their outcome
advantage.7 These changes were instituted to increase our ability to
draw causal conclusions.
Study 3
Social value orientations are stable dispositions that reflect the
central assumption of interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), i.e., that social interactions are not
only shaped by concerns about one's own payoff but also by broader
social or interpersonal concerns, such as concern with others'
outcomes, with joint outcomes, and with equality (Messick &
McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997).
The literature on negotiations typically identifies two social value
types: proselfs, who are predisposed to enhance their own payoffs,
either absolutely or relatively, and prosocials, who are predisposed
toward equal payoffs andmaximizing joint payoffs. We predicted that
prosocials would be more likely to reveal their exchange-rate
advantage and make more attractive offers than proselfs.
Study 3 also manipulated perspective taking, a cognitive capacity
to consider the world from others' points of view (e.g., Batson, Early, &
Salvarani, 1997; Davis, 1983; Van Beest et al., 2005). According to
Davis (1983), perspective taking allows people to anticipate the
behavior and reactions of others. Recent research on dyadic negotia-
tions found that negotiators who took the perspective of others
created and claimed more payoffs (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White,
2008). In essence, while interacting positively and creatively with
their counterparts, perspective takers also set the stage so that they
would benefit most.
In the context of coalition formation, we expected that perspective
taking might also have either of two inconsistent effects for prosocials
and proselfs. On the one hand, encouraging participants to take their
counterparts' perspectives might reduce the impact of social value7 We also conducted a similar experiment in which participants could either
disclose their exchange rate or deceive their counterparts by misrepresenting it.
Results showed that most participants provided false rather than true information
(66% vs. 34%), χ2(1, N=50)=5.12, p=.024. Participants who revealed truthfully also
made larger offers (M=10.35, SD=1.41 versus M=8.06, SD=2.19), F(1, 48)=15.23,
pb .001, η2=.24. Finally, fairness motivations (α=.82) continued to be positively
related to the size of individuals' offers, and this effect was again mediated by whether
a person revealed their exchange rate advantage. The regression of fairness on offers
was significant, β=.23 SE=.08, pb .01. The logistic regression of fairness on
information demission was also significant, β=5.21, SE=1.45, pb .001. Finally, the
regression of information on offers was significant, β=−1.93, SE=.71, pb .001, when
controlled for fairness, β=.08, SE=.09, ns. Sobel=−2.11, pb .05. Thus, these findings
replicated Study 2's effects and indicate that similar results emerge when the option to
reveal the truth was one of only two choice options.
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Table 4
The frequencies of revelations and lies about player As' exchange-rate advantage as a
function of social value orientations and perspective taking; Study 3.
Message Prosocials Proselfs
7I. van Beest et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2011) xxx–xxxorientations by encouraging everyone to disclose their exchange rates
and decrease their demands. In so doing, it might induce proselfs to
discover the strategic benefits of being more attractive then potential
rivals. On the other hand, however, perspective taking might amplify
the effects of social value orientations by alerting people to how they
might best negotiate if they were negotiating with themselves (i.e.,
the false consensus effect, Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This would
lead proselfs to negotiate as if they were negotiating with other
proselfs and prosocials to negotiate as if they were negotiating with
other prosocials. Steinel and De Dreu (2004), for instance, found that
bargainers used deception more when they expected that their
opponent had a proself rather than a prosocial orientation. Thus,
proselfs might be even less likely to disclose information than




Participants were 108 students (90 females and 18 males) from a
Dutch university (Mean age=20.69, SD=2.30); all were assigned the
role of player A in the 4(3–2–2) landowner game.8 Theywere told that
their outcomes from the bargaining would be their experimental pay.
After the negotiations, they learned that their counterpart was a
preprogrammed strategy; all were paid 4.50 Euro. The design was a 2
(perspective taking vs. control)×2 (social value orientation: proso-
cial, and proself) between-participants factorial.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 2 with the exception that we
now manipulated perspective taking and assessed social value
orientations before participants made any decisions, and participants
were required to either reveal their exchange rate advantage or, if
they chose, lie about it. We used Van Lange and Kuhlman's (1994)
standard, nine-itemmeasure to assess social value orientations. It has
excellent psychometric qualities: it is internally consistent (e.g. Parks,
1994), reliable over substantial time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman,
& Cotterell, 1992; Van Beest, Andeweg, Koning, Van lange, 2008), and
is not related to measures of social desirability (e.g., Platow, 1994). It
classifies individuals who value equality and maximum joint gain as
prosocials and individuals who value their own maximum gain,
absolutely or relatively, as proselfs. Fourteen unclassifiable partici-
pants were excluded from the analyses.
The perspective taking manipulation was introduced after parti-
cipants had read the instructions, but before they sent their message
about their exchange rate. Participants in the perspective taking
condition read this information (translated from Dutch): “Effective
negotiators know how to take the perspective of other negotiators.
They think about how others will behave and how they will react.
With whom would you (and for what reason) form a coalition if you
were either player B or player C?” Participants in the control condition
did not receive this information.
The experiment then proceeded as it had in Study 2. Following
their messages and choice of coalition partners, and the automatic
acceptance of their offers, participants completed a post-experiment
questionnaire that asked them to recall the exchange rates, the
number of chips that the winning coalition would receive, the size of
their parcel, and the coalitions that they could form. We also asked
participants to rate how much they had considered the viewpoint of
the other players when they made their offers, on a 7-point scale.
Finally, at the end of the questionnaire, we assessed whether their
behavior was motivated by fairness and/or by self-interest.8 Analyses of participants' gender led to no significant effects. However, as before,
the results should be interpreted cautiously, because so many participants were
women.
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Manipulation checks
All of the participants gave correct answers to all of the questions
on the experimental procedures. A series of 2×2 ANOVAs, on their
perspective taking, their motivation to obtain fair outcomes and to
maximize their own outcomes assessed and confirmed the effective-
ness of the manipulations. Participants in the perspective taking
condition (M=5.65, SD=1.04) indicated that they had taken others'
perspectives more than participants in the control condition did
(M=4.46, SD=1.68), F(1, 90)=16.31, pb .001. Prosocials were more
motivated to obtain fair outcomes (M=5.00, SD=1.61) than proselfs
(M=4.24, SD=1.80), F(1, 90)=4.62, pb .034, and proselfs (M=5.71,
SD=1.17) were more motivated to maximize their own outcomes
than prosocials (M=4.53, SD=1.62), F(1, 90)=15.67, pb .001. No
other effects in these analyses were significant.
Revelations
A 2 (social value orientation)×2 (perspective taking)×2 (revela-
tion) loglinear analysis assessed the effects of social value orientations
and perspective taking on revelations (see Table 4). As predicted,
prosocials revealed their exchange rate (60%) more than proselfs did
(34%), χ2(1, N=94)=6.61, p=.010. In addition, a significant
interaction, χ2(1, N=94)=4.01, p=.045, indicated that prosocials
revealed their exchange rate more in the perspective taking (72%)
than in the control condition (50%), χ2(1, N=53)=2.67, p=.05, but
proselfs revealed less in the perspective taking (26%) than in the
control condition (44%), χ2(1, N=41)=1.51, p=.10. Thus, perspec-
tive taking amplified rather than dampened the effects of social value
orientations: it did not “help” proselfs discover the benefits of being
more attractive then potential rivals.
Offers
As predicted, a 2×2×2 ANOVA showed that prosocials mademore
attractive offers than proselfs (M=9.47, SD=1.71 versus M=8.41,
SD=2.08), F(1, 90)=7.24, pb .009. Furthermore, it also led to a
marginally significant effect for revelations: as in Study 2, truth-tellers
made somewhat more attractive offers (M=9.56, SD=1.86) than
deceivers did (M=8.47, SD=1.89), F(1, 90)=3.11 p=.08.
A 2×2×2×3 (type of offer) loglinear analysis of the frequency of
equal, attractive, and unattractive offers replicated the main effects of
social value orientation and revelation, χ2(1, N=94)=4.90, p=.08
and χ2(1, N=94)=6.24, p=.04, respectively. In addition, perspec-
tive taking moderated the effect of social value orientations on types
of offers, χ2(1, N=94)=7.28, p=.02: taking others' perspectives led
prosocials to send fewer unattractive offers but led proselfs to send
more (see Table 5).
Mediation
Finally, we assessed whether the effect of social value orientations
on offers was mediated by revelations. A series of regression showed
that this was the case. The regression of social value orientations on
offers was significant, β=−1.05, SE=.391, pb .001. The logistic
regression of social value orientations on revelations was also
significant, β=−1.49, SE=.65, pb .001. Finally, the regression of
revelations on offers was significant, β=−.87, SE=.39, pb .05, whenPerspective taking Control Perspective taking Control
Revelation 18 14 6 8
Lie 7 14 17 10
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Percentage of offer types as a function of social value orientations (prosocial vs. proself)
and experimental conditions (perspective taking vs. control); Study 3.
Prosocial Proself
PT (%) Control (%) PT (%) Control (%)
Attractive 22 21 8 5
Equal 56 32 22 50
Unattractive 22 47 70 45
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SE=.40, pb .05. Sobel=1.60, p=.10.
Discussion
These results replicate and expand the findings of Study 2: not
revealing an advantageous exchange rate again went hand-in-hand
with making less attractive offers, and this choice mediated the effect
of fairness (in this case, social value orientation) on the attractiveness
of an offer. These results also extended Study 2's findings by adding
the effects of perspective taking. Ironically, the push to consider one's
counterparts' perspectives accentuated rather than alleviated a
proself social value orientation: it led proselfs to act more self-
interestedly, which, given Study 1's findings, suggests that perspec-
tive taking might further erode their prospects of being included in
winning coalitions and their ultimate monetary payoffs.
General discussion
Having a better exchange rate is a huge benefit for coalition
bargainers: it allows them to obtain better payoffs and to make more
attractive offers to their potential coalition partners. We assumed,
however, that people would squander this opportunity by focusing
more on the first benefit and less on the second benefit. Thus, we
predicted that people who had an exchange advantage would not use
it to signal how attractive they were as a coalition partner, unless they
were motivated by fairness. All three studies reported here supported
this logic.
Study 1 showed that people who had private information about an
exchange advantage did not use their strategic opportunities
effectively. The structure of their situation, facing two counterparts
whose resources were equal, made player As less preferred coalition
partners and they did not overcome these adverse preferences by
making more attractive offers. Although they could not reveal their
exchange rate advantage, they could have used it to make more
attractive offers. Instead, they did the exact opposite, making less
attractive offers than they did when their exchange rate advantage
was known. Thus, the bargainers who had the greatest strategic
options did extremely poorly. In contrast, when their exchange rate
advantage was common knowledge, they attracted more offers, made
more attractive offers, were included more often, and received
excellent overall outcomes.
Studies 2 and 3 focused on the underlying mechanisms of these
effects, with particular attention to fairness motivations, social value
orientations, and perspective taking. Both of these studies again
focused on whether advantaged coalition bargainers would reveal
how attractive theywere. As predicted, coalition bargainers whowere
motivated by self-interest rather than by fairness tended to actively
conceal their exchange advantage, made less attractive, more selfish
offers, and did less well for themselves as a result. In contrast,
coalition bargainers who had stronger fairness concerns tended to
reveal their exchange advantage, made better offers, and would thus
do better for themselves.
Study 3 also showed that perspective taking accentuated the
effects of individuals' social value orientations: taking their counter-
parts' points of view led proselfs to act more rather than less self-Please cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
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offers, but it led prosocials to act even more cooperatively. It appears
that this manipulation led both prosocials and proselfs to literally “put
themselves in the other person's shoes,” with proselfs focusing on
“themselves” and prosocials focusing on “the other person's shoes.”
Applying these results to the information dilemma (Murnighan et al.,
1999) suggests that proselfs attended more to the potential
exploitation that can follow information sharing while prosocials
attended more to the potential benefits.
Our logic is thus supported in three experiments, in which either
no communication was possible (Study 1; revelation vs. private
information rather was a feature of the experiment), or player As had
the choice between two options (Study 2; honestly revealing vs.
actively misrepresenting their exchange advantage), or player As had
the choice between three options (Study 3; honestly revealing, being
silent about or actively misrepresenting their exchange advantage).
Honest revelation helped player As in all experiments, and Study 2
further showed that lying by commission (i.e., active misrepresenta-
tion) was associated with the same coalition choices as lying by
omission (i.e., being silent). Therefore, our main conclusion is not that
deception hurts in coalition bargaining—even though this may
probably be the case in real life coalition negotiations, when deception
is revealed or detected. This, however, is an issue for future research.
Instead, what our results consistently showed is that honesty pays.
Coalition formation
The current research is the first to investigate the impact of private
information on coalition behavior. While research on dyadic negotia-
tions suggests that keeping information about asymmetric payoffs
private can be strategically beneficial (Kagel et al., 1996; Pillutla &
Murnighan, 1995; Straub & Murnighan, 1995; Van Dijk & Vermunt,
2000; Van Dijk et al., 2004), the current research shows that a similar
strategy in coalition bargaining can be particularly detrimental.
We tested our reasoning in a historically rich context, the 4(3–2–2)
game (e.g., Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff, 1967; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960;
Murnighan, 1991; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), in which coalition
bargainers have often overestimated the impact of resource differ-
entials when such resources are not critical (i.e., situations where
havingmore resources is not associatedwith havingmore possibilities
to form a coalition). This misunderstanding has led previous player As
to demandmore than is effective, increasing their chances of exclusion
and zero payoffs.We replicated this classicfinding in a setting inwhich
player As had additional payoff and information advantages. Only
when player As' hands were tied, and everyone knew about their
outcome advantages, were they included in as many winning
coalitions as their seemingly weaker counterparts.
Player As' exchange rate advantage was a real advantage—it set
them up to obtain better payoffs than their counterparts; their
resource advantage, in contrast, was only apparent. Thus, these results
suggest that coalition bargainers not only overvalued their non-
critical resources but they also failed to fully appreciate their critical
resources. In essence, they did not realize that what made them
attractive, in this case, was their ability to create larger outcomes for
their potential partners. By viewing the situation socially rather than
self-interestedly, perspective taking added to prosocials' already
effective orientation. In stark contrast, perspective taking led proselfs
to compound their initial, mistaken approach.
Future research should test the boundary conditions of these
effects. We used a single context, the 4(3–2–2) game, that created a
base rate in which player As would be likely to be excludedmore than
players B and C. Different games with different base rates could test
the generality of player As' strategic miscalculations. Consider, for
instance, the 2(1-1-1)-game, in which every player has an equal a
priori chance to be included and all of the players are likely to demand
an equal share of the rewards in every coalition. In this game, notnefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining,
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difference in value, may actually be strategically effective. Even in this
game, however, players are more likely to be included in winning
coalitions when they make more attractive offers than their rivals.
Thus, asking for less may again generally garner a coalition bargainer
more.
Another potential avenue of further research would be to increase
the number of times players participate in the coalition game. In our
Study 1, participants played only one game. Relevant here is that early
coalition research has demonstrated that coalition players adhere
more to game theoretic predictions when they have played a coalition
game several times (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960). Possibly, self-
interested players may discover the strategic benefits of making
attractive offers when they have played the game several times. In
similar vein, it should be noticed that we used students in our
experiments. It may be argued that they are perhaps not as skilled in
negotiations as peoplewho have hadmore experience in negotiations.
That is, more skilled bargainers who are self-interested may use their
advantages more effectively than the relative naive bargainers that
were used in the current set of studies.
Social value orientations
Our findings also provide further insight into the effects of social
values on coalition bargaining. Previous research suggests that
prosocials are especially reluctant to exclude individuals from
winning coalitions, even when counterparts contribute little or
nothing (Van Beest et al., 2003). Similar effects have surfaced in
group-versus-group negotiations (Van Beest et al., 2008). The present
findings extend this literature by showing that prosocials are also
more reluctant to deceive their potential partners than proselfs are,
especially when they have taken their potential coalition partners'
perspectives.
Research on dyadic negotiations has also shown that proselfs are
more likely to provide incorrect information than prosocials, and
bargainers were more deceptive when they knew that their
opponents had a proself rather than a prosocial orientation (Steinel
& De Dreu, 2004). Also unlike prosocials, proselfs have more often
used an information advantage tomaximize their own outcomes (Van
Dijk et al., 2004). The current findings show that prosocials and
proselfs do not alter their strategies in a coalition negotiation: proselfs
remained more deceptive and made less attractive offers than
prosocials. This fits with the proposition that humans have evolved
and learned specific strategies in dyadic interactions and may be
generalizing these strategies (Tooby et al., 2006) – even when they
are inappropriate and ineffective – to multiparty settings.
Perspective taking
Previous research has also shown that perspective taking is more
effective than empathy in dyadic negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008):
negotiators who considered their counterpart's position created and
claimed more than negotiators who did not consider their counter-
part's feelings. By combining perspective taking and social value
orientations, we observed beneficial effects for prosocials but
increasing costs for proselfs. Galinsky and colleagues did not assess
social value orientations but, based on the current results, we might
expect that, after taking others' perspectives, prosocials would be
more focused toward creating value and proselfs would be more
focused toward claiming value. This is consistent with Epley, Caruso,
and Bazerman (2006), who showed that perspective taking can
increase selfish behavior in competitively framed interactions.
Our perspective taking instructions were similar to those of
Galinsky et al. (2008): participants were told to imagine how they
would behave if they were in their counterpart's shoes. Research that
focuses individuals' attention on empathy (e.g., Batson et al., 1997;Please cite this article as: van Beest, I., et al., Honesty pays: On the be
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Batson and his colleagues have distinguished between imagining how
another person feels (other-perspective) and imagining how you
would feel (self-perspective) when perceiving the other's situation.
Their results indicate that taking the other-perspective is associated
more with altruistic motivations and taking the self-perspective is
associated more with egoistic motivations (Batson et al., 1997). The
fact that we used a self-perspective instructionmay thus be viewed as
a conservative test of our reasoning. Indeed, a direct application of
Batson's results to our paradigm might lead to a prediction of
increased egoism, for both proselfs and prosocials. Yet, this is not what
we observed. Instead, our perspective taking manipulation accentu-
ated the initial inclinations of prosocials and proselfs. Further research
might investigate the effects of asking people to consider their
potential partners' feelings.
We argued that people who were motivated by fairness would be
more likely to benefit than those who are motivated by self-interest.
People who are motivated by fairness are more likely to disclose their
outcome advantage and more likely to make attractive offers than
people who are less motivated by fairness. We must stress here that
we are not arguing that fair people have a better understanding of the
situation and somehow see the strategic benefits of disclosing
information. Instead, we are suggesting that they have a natural
inclination to behave in a specific way and this specific inclination
happens to be successful in this context. In fact, our findings even
suggest that such inclinations are quite pervasive, given the fact that
telling them to actively consider the position of their counterpart did
not reduce their initial inclinations.Conclusions
Economic theory and empirical research indicate that negotiators
are particularly responsive to the down side of the information
dilemma (Murnighan et al., 1999), leading them to keep their
personal information private. Because so many of our experiences
(and a considerable amount of research) involve dyadic negotiations,
cautiousness may often be warranted. The results of the current
experiments, however, show that generalizing these strategies to
coalition bargaining can be particularly ineffective. In fact, the current
research suggests that, contrary to the general wisdom of dyadic
negotiations, honesty may actually be the best policy in coalition
bargaining, both in the short and the long term. A concern for others'
outcomes – fairness – also appears to be self-beneficial, in terms of
both inclusion and outcomes for individuals who have a potential
outcome advantage. Thus, rather than interfering with the opportu-
nity to strike a good deal, honesty can facilitate the formation of
valuable coalitions and, in conjunction with fairness motivations,
contribute to better individual outcomes as well. Thus, in this case,
honesty wins all around.References
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